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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
BECKER, Circuit Judge. 
 
This is an appeal by Roderick Frey, who was convicted by 
a Pennsylvania state court jury of murder in thefirst degree 
and was sentenced to death, from a final order of the 
district court denying his petition for a writ of habeas 
corpus. Frey's appeal requires us to consider whether the 
jury charge at the penalty phase of his trial violated the 
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Eighth Amendment as construed in Mills v. Maryland, 486 
U.S. 367 (1988) and McKoy v. North Carolina, 494 U.S. 433 
(1990). These cases hold that a death sentence should be 
vacated if the jury, upon receiving the judge's instructions, 
may have thought that it could only consider those 
mitigating factors which it unanimously found to exist. 
Because we conclude that the charge was reasonably likely 
to have had that effect, we will reverse the order of the 
district court and direct it to grant a conditional writ of 
habeas corpus permitting Pennsylvania to conduct a new 
sentencing proceeding or to sentence Frey to life 
imprisonment. 
 
I. Facts and Procedural History 
 
The following are the basic background facts. A fuller 
factual history is set forth in our opinion on Frey's previous 
appeal on different issues, see Frey v. Fulcomer, 974 F.2d 
348, 351-56 (3d Cir. 1992) ("Frey I"). 
 
Roderick and Barbara Frey were married in 1956. By 
1979, they were experiencing difficulty in their marriage 
and spoke of divorce. Financial difficulties and the death of 
their son in an automobile accident two years earlier had 
contributed to their marital discord. Frey apparently also 
had engaged in extramarital affairs. Frey worked as a truck 
driver for the Turkey Hill dairy chain. His job brought him 
into contact with Charles Zehring, the manager of a Turkey 
Hill convenience store, whom the Pennsylvania Supreme 
Court later described as suffering from mental illnesses, 
including paranoid schizophrenia. See Commonwealth v. 
Frey, 475 A.2d 700, 702 (1984). By mid-1979, Frey had 
begun discussing with Zehring his marital difficulties, as 
well as his concerns about the financial strain that would 
be caused by a divorce. Zehring suggested as a solution 
that Frey arrange to have Mrs. Frey killed in a manner that 
made her death appear accidental. 
 
In October 1979, Barbara Frey sued Frey for divorce, and 
he moved out of their home. Around the same time, Frey 
and Zehring finalized an arrangement whereby Frey agreed 
to pay Zehring five thousand dollars to kill his wife. Frey 
financed the deal by borrowing the money from Barbara 
against their expected property settlement. 
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On November 8, 1979, Frey arranged to meet Barbara 
early in the morning at the Turkey Hill convenience store 
where she worked. Frey then passed along information to 
Zehring about her schedule and likely route to the store. In 
the meantime, Zehring, in exchange for five hundred 
dollars, enlisted the assistance of Richard Heberlig. Though 
Heberlig was initially led to believe that he would only be 
assaulting the intended victim, he became aware, on the 
morning of November 8, that murder was in fact planned. 
 
Zehring and Heberlig set out at four a.m. on November 8 
to locate and kill Barbara Frey. Posing as police officers, 
they pulled her car over to the side of the road and 
approached her. Their plan at that point was to beat Mrs. 
Frey into unconsciousness and then stage an auto accident 
as their cover. When she did not lose consciousness, 
Heberlig panicked and shot her in the chest. After the 
shooting, they moved Mrs. Frey's car to a nearbyfield 
where they failed in an attempt to set the car onfire. Frey 
subsequently paid Zehring the balance of the money he 
owed for the contract killing. 
 
Barbara Frey's body was discovered by a passerby later 
that morning. On December 6, 1979, Frey confessed to the 
murder. Zehring and Heberlig were subsequently arrested, 
and all three men were charged with murder and 
conspiracy. Zehring and Heberlig pled guilty and received 
sentences of life imprisonment. 
 
Despite an earlier confession, which he later recanted, 
Frey opted to stand trial before a jury. The defense called as 
a witness a psychologist who testified to Frey's low-to- 
normal IQ, his basically submissive personality, his 
minimal tendency to defend himself, and his risk averse 
nature. The defense proceeded to argue that Zehring had 
threatened Frey, and that Frey had paid Zehring the five 
thousand dollars as extortion money in an effort to protect 
his family. The jury was apparently unconvinced by the 
story, for it found Frey guilty of murder in thefirst degree. 
 
A sentencing hearing followed immediately. After counsel 
for both Frey and the Commonwealth had presented their 
arguments, the court instructed the jurors on how they 
were to assess the evidence before them in order to decide 
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whether Frey was to be sentenced to life imprisonment or 
to death. Part of that deliberative process involved 
consideration of the aggravating and mitigating 
circumstances in Frey's case, and the state trial judge gave 
the following instruction: 
 
       [T]he verdict must be a sentence of death if the jury 
       unanimously finds at least one aggravating 
       circumstance and no mitigating circumstance, or if the 
       jury unanimously finds one or more aggravating 
       circumstances which outweigh any mitigating 
       circumstances. The verdict must be a sentence of life 
       imprisonment in all other cases. 
 
App. at 286. 
 
The judge then told the jury that there was only one 
relevant aggravating circumstance (contract murder) but 
that there were six possible mitigating circumstances: 
Frey's lack of prior convictions; the influence of mental 
disturbance; impairment of the ability to appreciate the 
criminality of the act; youth or advanced age; duress or 
substantial domination by another person; and any other 
circumstances that they, as jurors, would consider relevant. 
Finally, the judge instructed the jury that the 
Commonwealth must prove aggravating circumstances 
beyond a reasonable doubt, but that the defense need only 
prove mitigating circumstances by a preponderance of the 
evidence. 
 
On May 15, 1989, after five and one-half hours of 
deliberation, the jury returned a sentence of death. 
Following his sentencing, Frey retained new counsel and 
appealed his conviction and sentence to the Pennsylvania 
Supreme Court, which affirmed. See Commonwealth v. 
Frey, 475 A.2d 700 (1984). In that appeal Frey raised 
several arguments, including a claim that his sentence was 
disproportionate relative to the life sentences given to his 
accomplices. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that 
the cases of Zehring and Heberlig were not "similar" for 
purposes of the proportionality review required by 42 Pa. 
Cons. Stat. Ann. S 9711(h)(3)(iii) (Purdon 1982). 
 
In July 1984, Frey petitioned for relief under 
Pennsylvania's Post Conviction Hearing Act, 42 Pa. Cons. 
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Stat. Ann. S 9543(3)(xiii) (Purdon 1982) alleging exculpatory 
after-discovered evidence -- statements made by Zehring 
while in prison evidencing Zehring's domination of Frey. 
The Court of Common Pleas denied Frey's motion, and the 
Pennsylvania Supreme Court affirmed. See Commonwealth 
v. Frey, 517 A.2d 1265 (1986). The Supreme Court held 
that Frey could have elicited this evidence during the guilt 
phase of the trial, and, at all events, that a different verdict 
was unlikely. 
 
Frey again petitioned under Pennsylvania's Post 
Conviction Hearing Act on various other theories, including 
ineffective assistance of counsel. Both the Court of 
Common Pleas and the Pennsylvania Supreme Court 
rejected Frey's claims, holding, inter alia, that Frey had 
suffered no prejudice from his counsel's failure to 
accurately state the law regarding mitigating circumstances 
to the jury at sentencing. See Commonwealth v. Frey, 554 
A.2d 27 (1989). In this petition Frey also contended that 
the jury charge at the penalty phase of his trial violated 
Mills. This argument was also rejected. See 554 A.2d at 30- 
31. 
 
His state court remedies exhausted, Frey then turned to 
federal court. In March 1991, he filed a petition for a writ 
of habeas corpus, 28 U.S.C. S 2254 (1988), in the District 
Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania. Although the 
district court denied the petition with respect to all guilt 
phase issues, it found that Frey had received ineffective 
assistance of counsel at the penalty phase and was 
prejudiced thereby, and that the court had improperly 
admitted certain testimony at that stage of the proceedings 
as well.1 Accordingly, the district court granted Frey a writ 
of habeas corpus, without prejudice to the Commonwealth's 
right to resentence Frey to life imprisonment, or 
alternatively, to conduct further proceedings. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. The testimony at issue involved Sharon Bowers, an acquaintance of 
Frey's. Although not appearing at the guilt phase of the trial, Bowers 
testified at the sentencing phase that Frey complained often of his 
problems with Mrs. Frey, and that on one occasion in May or June of 
1979 Frey told Bowers that "I would kill the son of a bitch [sic] if I 
knew 
I could get away with it." 
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The Commonwealth appealed to this court, and on July 
10, 1991, we vacated the district court's grant of habeas 
corpus relief. See Frey I. We held that although 
performance of defendant's trial counsel was deficient at 
the penalty stage, habeas relief was not appropriate under 
the test of Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984), 
since it was not reasonably probable that the jury would 
have sentenced Frey to life imprisonment rather than death 
had Frey been afforded effective assistance of counsel.2 We 
also held that Frey was not denied due process by the 
admission of the Bowers' testimony. We remanded the 
matter for further reconsideration of other issues raised by 
Frey's habeas petition. In October 1995, after an additional 
hearing and supplemental briefing, the district court denied 
the petition. 
 
Frey now appeals the order of the district court denying 
his petition for habeas corpus relief, raising a host of legal 
issues. However, as noted in the margin, only the question 
whether the jury charge at the penalty phase impermissibly 
required the jury to unanimously find the existence of 
mitigating circumstances in violation of the Eighth 
Amendment warrants extended discussion.3  Our review of 
this legal issue is plenary. See Frey I, 974 F.2d at 356. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. As part of his alleged deficient performance at the penalty phase, 
Frey's counsel had based his arguments to the jury on a Pennsylvania 
death penalty statute that had been held unconstitutional three years 
earlier, largely because the statute improperly restricted the defendant's 
ability to argue mitigating circumstances to the jury. See Frey I, 974 
F.2d at 350. We found that this was not prejudicial error in part because 
the trial judge properly instructed the jury as to which aggravating and 
mitigating factors to consider, as well as how the jury should balance 
those factors. See id. at 351. Although we stated at that time that the 
court "carefully" instructed the jury, and that the judge read "proper 
instructions" on how to weigh the aggravating and mitigating factors, the 
question whether the jury charge itself violated Mills-McKoy was not 
before us at that time and thus those earlier remarks are not controlling 
here. 
 
3. Frey advances four other bases for relief. First, he once again raises 
an ineffective assistance of counsel claim. We considered this claim in 
Frey I, and determined that Frey was not prejudiced by the failings of his 
attorney. See supra note 2. But Frey now argues that O'Neal v. 
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II. The Jury Charge 
 
Frey challenges his sentence on the ground that the jury 
charge at the penalty phase of his trial violated the Eighth 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
McAninch, ___ U.S. ___, 115 S.Ct. 992 (1995) creates a new standard for 
review of ineffective assistance of counsel claims and thus requires this 
court to reconsider the matter. We find this contention without merit 
and decline to reconsider Frey's ineffective assistance of counsel claim. 
In brief, O'Neal does not change the standard applicable to these types 
of claims; instead, it only requires that when a court is in "grave doubt" 
about the likely effect of an error on a jury's verdict, that court should 
not treat that error as harmless. See id. at 994; see also Yohn v. Love, 
76 F.3d 508, 522 (3d Cir. 1996)(construing O'Neal). Even assuming that 
this case would trigger an O'Neal analysis, this court did not indicate at 
any point in its prior opinion that it was in grave doubt about Frey's 
claim. Indeed, in Frey I we stated that counsel's "shortcomings, though 
highly unfortunate, have not undermined [our] confidence in the 
outcome." 974 F.2d at 369 (internal quotations omitted). O'Neal would 
not command a different result. 
 
Second, Frey argues that the state trial court erred when it failed to 
instruct the jury that the defendant's age could be considered as a 
mitigating circumstance, in violation of both 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. 
S 9711(e)(4) (Purdon 1982), which provides that age can be a mitigating 
circumstance, and the Eighth Amendment. We find this argument to 
lack merit, and agree with the Pennsylvania Supreme Court which stated 
that, whereas youth and old age could be considered a mitigating 
circumstance, middle age -- Frey was 42 at the time he committed the 
crime -- could not. At all events, we note that the jury instructions 
clearly indicated to the jurors that they could consider any 
circumstances that they felt were relevant as mitigating evidence. 
 
Third, Frey raises a claim regarding the alleged after acquired 
evidence. He submits that statements made by Zehring after Frey's 
sentencing was complete constitute after acquired evidence and thus 
merit a new sentencing hearing. Because we conclude that Frey's death 
sentence must be vacated and remand the matter for further 
proceedings, we need not reach this issue. Frey will have the opportunity 
to offer Zehring's statements as evidence. Should a question of 
admissibility arise in connection with these statements, that 
determination will be properly made by the trial court in the first 
instance. 
 
Finally, Frey challenges the constitutionality of Pennsylvania's 
proportionality review under the 14th Amendment. For the same reason, 
we do not reach the merits of this issue. See infra at note 7. 
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Amendment as construed by the Supreme Court in Mills v. 
Maryland, 486 U.S. 367 (1988) and McKoy v. North 
Carolina, 494 U.S. 433 (1990). More specifically, Frey 
contends that the charge impermissibly led members of the 
jury to believe that a particular mitigating circumstance 
could not be considered unless there was unanimous 
agreement regarding proof of that circumstance. 
 
The Commonwealth counters that there is "no likelihood 
that a reasonable juror could have concluded that they 
were prohibited from considering the mitigating evidence 
that they found to exist and that was supported by proof of 
a preponderance of the evidence," and thus, the 
Commonwealth argues, the trial court's charge did not 
suffer from the deficiencies animating Mills and McKoy. In 
addition, the Commonwealth contends that we considered 
the same issue in Zettlemoyer v. Fulcomer, 923 F.2d 284 
(3d Cir. 1991), and that our approval of the jury charge in 
that case should control our decision here.4 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
4. We note at the outset that Frey's Mills challenge might be subject to 
the bar on retroactive application of new legal rules to cases on 
collateral 
review announced in Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288 (1989)(plurality 
opinion). Under Teague, a case that announces a new legal rule after the 
defendant's conviction became final should not be applied retroactively 
unless the rule falls within one of Teague's narrow exceptions. See also 
Sawyer v. Smith, 497 U.S. 227 (1990). Whether Teague would bar 
retroactive application of Mills is a close and difficult question upon 
which the circuits are split. Compare Williams v. Dixon, 961 F.2d 448, 
459 (4th Cir. 1992)(holding that Mills survives Teague bar), with Miller 
v. 
Lockhart, 65 F.3d 676, 685-86 (8th Cir. 1995)(holding that Mills 
challenge is subject to Teague bar), and Nethery v. Collins, 993 F.2d 
1154, 1162 (5th Cir. 1993)(same). We have not previously taken a 
definitive position on this debate. In Zettlemoyer we were confronted with 
this precise issue; although we decided to reach the merits of the Mills 
claim in that case, we did not expressly hold whether Mills falls outside 
the Teague bar. See 923 F.2d at 306 n.19. We also note that the district 
court for the District of Delaware, in a brief but thoughtful opinion, has 
concluded that Mills does not announce a"new rule" for Teague 
purposes. See DeShields v. Snyder, 829 F. Supp. 676, 687-88 (D. Del. 
1993) (Farnan, J.). 
 
At all events, we do not reach this issue here, as the Commonwealth 
has failed to raise it in its brief, and thus we deem the issue waived. 
See 
Williams, 961 F.2d at 459 (finding waiver). We therefore proceed to the 
merits. 
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A. The Mills-McKoy-Boyde Standard 
 
Under the Supreme Court's current construction of the 
Eighth Amendment, the sentencer in a death penalty case 
must be permitted to consider all relevant mitigating 
evidence that the defendant proffers as counseling less 
than a sentence of death. Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 
104 (1982); Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586 (1978). 
Accordingly, it is well established that the sentencer cannot 
be precluded from considering any such evidence. Skipper 
v. South Carolina, 476 U.S. 1 (1986); Eddings, 455 U.S. at 
114. The source of this preclusion is irrelevant; whether its 
source is statutory (Lockett), the sentencing court (Eddings), 
or an evidentiary ruling (Skipper), the result is the same. 
 
In Mills, the Supreme Court relied on these precedents to 
conclude that a death sentence should be vacated if there 
is a substantial probability that reasonable jurors, upon 
receiving the judge's instructions and attempting to 
complete the verdict form based on those instructions, may 
have thought that they could only consider those mitigating 
factors which they unanimously found to exist. Put 
differently, if the jurors were led to believe that they 
could not each individually consider certain mitigating 
circumstances because there was not unanimous 
agreement as to the existence of those circumstances, then 
"some jurors were prevented from considering factors which 
may call for a less severe penalty, and petitioner's sentence 
cannot stand." Id. at 376 (internal citations omitted). See 
also Zettlemoyer v. Fulcomer, 923 F.2d 284, 306-07 (1991) 
(discussing Mills). 
 
The "intuitively disturbing" hypothetical scenario which 
Mills precludes is the following: All 12 jurors agree that 
some mitigating circumstances are present, and that those 
mitigating circumstances outweigh any aggravating 
circumstances. But since the jury cannot unanimously 
agree that the same mitigating circumstances are present, 
they would not be permitted to engage in any deliberation 
on the appropriateness of death versus life imprisonment. 
See Mills, 486 U.S. at 374. Moreover, since Eighth 
Amendment jurisprudence requires that each sentencer be 
permitted to consider all mitigating circumstances, the Mills 
Court did not require proof of actual confusion. The Court 
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reasoned that "[t]he possibility that a single juror could 
block such consideration [of a mitigating circumstance], 
and consequently require the jury to impose the death 
penalty, is one we dare not risk." Id. at 384. Thus, the 
Court required proof of only a substantial probability of 
confusion on this element of the charge. 
 
Two years later, the Court reaffirmed the importance of 
Mills in McKoy v. North Carolina, 494 U.S. 433 (1990). In 
McKoy, the trial court similarly instructed the jury that it 
must unanimously find the existence of any mitigating 
circumstances in order to weigh those circumstances in the 
sentencing determination. Attempting to distinguish itself 
from the Maryland statute at issue in Mills, North Carolina 
argued that its death penalty sentencing scheme allowed 
the jury to recommend life imprisonment even if had found 
no mitigating circumstances. Id. at 438. The Court 
determined that this distinction did not cure the 
constitutional defect. Id. at 439. In sum, the essential 
holding of Mills-McKoy is simply that one juror cannot 
prevent the others from giving effect to mitigating evidence, 
regardless of whether the imposition of a life sentence 
depends on the existence of such evidence. See id. at 440. 
 
Finally, in 1990, the Court clarified the legal standard for 
the review of jury instructions when the claim is that the 
instruction is ambiguous and open to an erroneous 
interpretation (as was the case in Mills). In Boyde v. 
California, 494 U.S. 370, 380 (1990), the Court held that 
the proper standard in these cases is "whether there is a 
reasonable likelihood that the jury has applied the 
challenged instruction in a way that prevents the 
consideration of constitutionally relevant evidence." We note 
that the difference between the standard of review originally 
outlined in Mills and the standard ultimately adopted in 
Boyde is not purely semantic. Under the Mills "substantial 
probability" standard our focus was directed to how a single 
hypothetical juror might have reacted to the erroneous 
instruction. Under the Boyde standard, we are told by the 
Court, our focus should be on the reasonable likelihood 
that the entire jury applied the instruction in an improper 
manner. See Boyde, 494 U.S. at 380. Thus, while our 
inquiry is directed toward whether the Frey instruction 
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suffers from the same type of defect discussed in Mills (i.e. 
that the instruction could be read to require a unanimous 
finding of mitigating circumstances), our standard is that of 
Boyde, not Mills. See Zettlemoyer, 923 F.2d at 307. 
 
B. The Zettlemoyer Charge 
 
We have had occasion to apply the Mills-McKoy-Boyde 
analysis to a similar case. In Zettlemoyer, supra, we 
considered the propriety of the following instruction (which 
we set forth at length for purposes of comparison): 
 
       Again, if you find unanimously, beyond a reasonable 
       doubt, the aggravating circumstance that I have 
       mentioned, . . . that is an aggravating circumstance. 
 
       . . . 
 
       [Y]ou are obligated by your oath of office to fix the 
       penalty at death if you unanimously agree and find 
       beyond a reasonable doubt that there is an aggravating 
       circumstances (sic) and either no mitigating 
       circumstance or that the aggravating circumstance 
       outweighs any mitigating circumstances. 
 
923 F.2d at 307-08. We found that this instruction was not 
faulty under Mills. See id. at 308. We placed emphasis on 
the "if you unanimously agree and find" language 
reproduced above, and reasoned that it meant "only that 
the jury's ultimate conclusion must be unanimous, not that 
each interim step in its deliberations be unanimous." Id. 
 
In other words, we found that the word "unanimously" in 
the latter part of the jury charge only modified the word 
"agree" in the sense that the instruction was reasonably 
likely to have been understood by the jury to have meant 
something akin to: you must fix the penalty at death if you 
unanimously agree to the ultimate conclusion that either 
there is an aggravating circumstance and no mitigating 
circumstances or that the aggravating circumstance 
outweighs any mitigating circumstances. Accordingly, we 
concluded that the fact that the jury "must unanimously 
agree that the aggravating must outweigh the mitigating is 
not the same as unanimously agreeing that a mitigating 
factor exists." Id. 
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This interpretation of the court's "agree and find" 
language was further suggested by other statements earlier 
in the Zettlemoyer jury charge. For example, the trial court 
had previously instructed the jury that: 
 
       If you find that aggravating circumstance and find no 
       mitigating circumstances or if you find that the 
       aggravating circumstance which I mentioned to you 
       outweighs any mitigating circumstance you find, your 
       verdict must be the death penalty. If, on the other 
       hand, you find that the Commonwealth has not proven 
       an aggravating circumstance beyond a reasonable 
       doubt or if they have, that the mitigating 
       circumstances outweight (sic) the aggravating 
       circumstances, then you must bring in a verdict of life 
       imprisonment. 
 
This instruction basically repeats the information presented 
to the jury in the instruction discussed above. It is notable, 
however, that this instruction provides the jury with the 
same decision calculus without the use of the term 
"unanimously". Additionally, this instruction refers to 
aggravating circumstances outweighing "any mitigating 
circumstance you may find". Taken together, this language 
supports our conclusion that Zettlemoyer's later use of the 
term "unanimously" in the jury charge could not be said to 
support a reasonable likelihood that the jury believed it 
must unanimously agree on the existence of mitigating 
circumstances. 
 
C. The Frey Charge 
 
We turn to the jury instruction in the present case. The 
trial court charged: 
 
       Members of the jury, you must now decide whether 
       this defendant should be sentenced to death or life 
       imprisonment. The sentence will depend upon your 
       findings concerning aggravating and mitigating 
       circumstances. The Crimes Code provides that the 
       verdict must be a sentence of death if the jury 
       unanimously finds at least one aggravating 
       circumstance and no mitigating circumstance, or if the 
       jury unanimously finds one or more aggravating 
       circumstances which outweigh any mitigating 
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       circumstances. The verdict must be a sentence of life 
       imprisonment in all other cases. 
 
       . . . 
 
       Remember that your verdict must be a sentence of 
       death if you unanimously find at least one aggravating 
       circumstances (sic) and no mitigating circumstances, 
       or if you unanimously find one or more aggravating 
       circumstances which outweigh any mitigating 
       circumstances. In all other cases, your verdict must be 
       a sentence of life imprisonment. 
 
App. at 286-89. Although similar in many respects to the 
charge at issue in Zettlemoyer, there is also a significant 
and distinguishing dissimilarity here. 
 
As noted above, the determinative question for our 
purposes is what the jury could have understood the 
charge to mean, and whether it is reasonably likely that 
that understanding would have precluded the jurors' 
independent consideration of any mitigating circumstances. 
Specifically, we must determine whether it is reasonably 
likely that the jury could have understood the charge to 
require unanimity in consideration of mitigating evidence. 
We need not determine whether the jurors did, in fact, 
understand the charge to require unanimity in 
consideration of mitigating evidence -- only whether it was 
reasonably likely. See Boyde, 494 U.S. at 380; Mills, 486 
U.S. at 384. 
 
Examining the language of the jury charge, we must 
answer in the affirmative. First and foremost, read in its 
entirety, the relevant portion of the jury charge emphasizes 
the importance of a unanimous finding, using the phrase 
frequently and in close proximity to -- within seven words 
of -- the mitigating circumstances clause. We rescribe the 
relevant portion of the sentence: "if the jury unanimously 
finds at least one aggravating circumstance and no 
mitigating circumstance. . . ." Considering this close 
proximity -- the clause is, to the ear and to the mind, one 
sound bite -- it is quite possible that a juror would, 
regardless of other qualifying language, believe that 
mitigating circumstances had to be found unanimously. 
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This conclusion is not inconsistent with our holding in 
Zettlemoyer (where the separation was by seventeen words, 
and not one sound bite). Moreover, as noted above, we 
found the Zettlemoyer instruction to require unanimity in 
the ultimate conclusion, and not in the interim findings 
leading to that conclusion. See Zettlemoyer, 923 F.2d at 
308. This was because the Zettlemoyer trial court used the 
term "unanimously" to modify only the term "agree" in the 
subsequent phrase "agree and find". In the present case, 
the court did not instruct the jury to "fix the penalty at 
death if you unanimously agree and find...," but rather 
instructed them to so fix that sentence "if the jury 
unanimously finds" (emphasis added). Thus, the unanimity 
language in the Frey charge could only modify the term 
"find," and hence the jury could reasonably have believed 
that unanimity was required in both its ultimate and 
interim conclusions, especially given the close proximity we 
have described. This possibility, not present in Zettlemoyer, 
violates Mills.5 
 
Other parts of the Frey charge were more likely to 
increase the confusion rather than lessen it. As in 
Zettlemoyer, the Frey trial court made a point of instructing 
the jury on the relevant burdens of proof relating to both 




5. Moreover, at no point did the Frey state trial judge make a statement 
clarifying each juror's right to consider mitigating evidence absent the 
agreement of fellow jurors, a factor noted in Kubat v. Thieret, 867 F.2d 
351, 373 (7th Cir. 1989) ("Kubat's jurors were never expressly informed 
in plain and simple language that if even one juror believed that the 
death penalty should not be imposed, Robert Kubat would not be 
sentenced to death."); see also Kordenbrock v. Scroggy, 919 F.2d 1091, 
1110 (6th Cir. 1990) (en banc) ("Because the jurors in this case were told 
that aggravating factors had to be unanimous, but were not told exactly 
what role mitigating factors play, it would have been reasonable for them 
to assume that mitigating factors had to be found unanimously as 
well."). While the absence of such an express statement is not 
dispositive, for such absence was not discussed in Zettlemoyer (which 
post-dated both Kubat and Kordenbrock), we reference these cases to 
suggest one means by which the trial court could have clarified its 
instructions for the jury. The adoption by Pennsylvania of a uniform 
verdict slip, see infra at 17, supports this view. 
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       Now, the Commonwealth has the burden of proving 
       aggravating circumstances beyond a reasonable doubt. 
       . . . The defendant has the burden of proving mitigating 
       circumstances but only by a preponderance of the 
       evidence. This is a lesser burden of proof than beyond 
       a reasonable doubt. . . . All the evidence from both 
       sides, including the evidence you heard earlier during 
       the trial in chief, as to aggravating or mitigating 
       circumstances, is important and appropriate for you to 
       consider. 
 
App. at 288. It is what is not said here that is significant. 
Unlike Zettlemoyer, where the court specifically instructed 
the jury that aggravating circumstances must be proven 
"unanimously, beyond a reasonable doubt," the trial court 
here did not stress that the different burdens that attach 
to aggravating and mitigating circumstances also 
entail different unanimity requirements. A lay jury might 
plausibly conclude, therefore, that aggravating and 
mitigating circumstances must be discussed and 
unanimously agreed to, as is typically the case when 
considering whether a burden of proof has been met. Such 
an understanding, however, is plainly inconsistent with the 
requirements of Mills, and adds to our concern that the jury 
could have understood the charge to require unanimity in 
consideration of mitigating evidence. 
 
In sum, we find that, in light of the emphasis placed in 
this charge on unanimous findings, its close proximity to 
the "mitigating circumstance" language, and the manner in 
which this charge deviates from the Zettlemoyer charge, it 
was reasonably likely that the jury could have believed that 
it was required to find the existence of mitigating 
circumstances unanimously before those circumstances 
could be considered in its deliberations. For that reason, 
the charge violates Mills. 
 
D. The Verdict Slip 
 
The Commonwealth correctly notes in its brief that the 
verdict slip used in Zettlemoyer was substantially the same 
as the verdict slip used in the present case. We also 
recognize that the court's charge in this case tracked the 
language set forth in that verdict slip. However, as noted 
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above, the text of the charge in Zettlemoyer differed 
significantly from the one in the present case. Since 
Zettlemoyer considered the verdict form and the court's 
instructions as a whole in reaching its decision, see 
Zettlemoyer, 923 F.2d at 308 n.22, and since the charge 
here was significantly different, the discussion in 
Zettlemoyer regarding the propriety of the verdict slip is not 
controlling. 
 
Moreover, as we noted in Zettlemoyer, subsequent to 
Frey's trial Pennsylvania adopted a uniform verdict slip for 
capital sentencing cases which expressly aims to eliminate 
the type of ambiguity at issue here. See Pa. R. Crim. P. 358A.6 
While both Mills and Zettlemoyer expressed a hesitancy to 
"infer too much about the prior verdict form from the . . . 
well-meant efforts to remove ambiguity from the State's 
capital sentencing scheme," Mills also noted and inferred 
from such changes "at least some concern . . . that juries 
could misunderstand the previous instructions as to 
unanimity and the consideration of mitigating evidence by 
individual jurors." Mills, 486 U.S. at 382. Although joint 
consideration of the constitutionally permissible jury charge 
and the verdict form in Zettlemoyer led us to the conclusion 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
6. The revised instruction provides, in part: 
 
       B. The findings on which the sentence of death is based are (check 
       one): 
 
       __1. At least one aggravating circumstance and no mitigating 
       circumstance. 
 
            The aggravating circumstance(s) unanimously found (is)(are): 
 
            . . . 
 
       __2. One or more aggravating circumstances which outweigh(s) any 
       mitigating circumstance(s). 
 
            The aggravating circumstance(s) unanimously found (is)(are): 
 
            . . . 
 
            The mitigating circumstance(s) found by one or more of us 
            (is)(are): 
 
           . . . . 
 
Pa. R. Crim. P. 358A (emphasis added). 
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that the amended form was not necessary to prevent a 
reasonable likelihood of jury error, such is not the case 
here. While we express no opinion on the constitutional 
necessity of any particular amendment to the verdict form, 
we do believe that the instruction and the verdict form in 
the present case taken as a whole are insufficient (and that 




Though we recognize that the interpretation offered by 
the Commonwealth is plausible, instructed by the teachings 
of Mills and its progeny that "[t]he possibility that a single 
juror could block such consideration [of a mitigating 
circumstance], and consequently require the jury to impose 
the death penalty, is one we dare not risk," id. at 384, we 
conclude that the charge in this case was ambiguous, 
reasonably likely to confuse the jury, and thus in error. 
Because we find that the jury could have understood 
the charge to preclude consideration of mitigating 
circumstances that were not agreed to by all twelve jurors, 
and because that creates a risk that the death penalty was 
imposed in spite of "factors which may call for a less severe 
penalty," we must direct vacatur of Frey's sentence. See id. 
at 376. We do so, however, without prejudice to 
Pennsylvania's right to sentence Frey to life imprisonment 
or to conduct a new sentencing hearing in a manner not 
inconsistent with this opinion.7 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
7. As noted supra, Frey also contends that habeas corpus relief is 
appropriate on the grounds that the Pennsylvania Supreme Court's 
proportionality review was procedurally and substantively inadequate, 
and therefore in violation of Frey's due process rights. The 
Commonwealth rejoins that the proportionality review statute, 42 Pa. 
Cons. Stat. Ann. S 9711(h)(3)(iii), does not create any cognizable liberty 
interest, and therefore cannot ground a due process claim. On this point 
it relies on Greenholtz v. Inmates of the Nebraska Penal and Correctional 
Complex, 442 U.S. 1 (1979), and its progeny. In general, the Greenholtz 
line of decisions stands for the proposition that state-created liberty 
interests will be found when the state (1) establishes substantive 
predicates to guide official decisionmaking, and (2) uses explicit 
mandatory language in its regulations directing the decisionmaker to 
reach a particular outcome if the substantive predicates are present. See 
Kentucky Department of Corrections v. Thompson, 490 U.S. 454, 461-63 
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The order of the district court will be reversed with 
instructions to grant the writ of habeas corpus 
conditionally, with the proviso that Pennsylvania shall, 
within 120 days, conduct a new sentencing hearing in a 
manner not inconsistent with this opinion, or sentence Frey 
to life imprisonment. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
(1989). The Commonwealth maintains that the proportionality review 
mandated by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court does not meet this 
standard. 
 
We note, however, that it is uncertain whether the United States 
Supreme Court would follow this approach, or indeed, how it would rule 
on this issue. Accord Ellis v. District of Columbia, 84 F.3d 1413, 1417 
(D.C. Cir. 1996) (noting uncertainty regarding Supreme Court doctrine 
on state-created liberty interests). This is because the recent decision 
in 
Sandin v. Conner, -- U.S. --, 115 S.Ct. 2293 (1995), while not overruling 
any prior cases, see id. at 2300 n.5, sharply criticizes and effectively 
abandons the Court's prior methodology (as articulated in cases such as 
Greenholtz) for determining the existence of a statutory liberty interest 
in 
the prisoner's rights context. See Ellis, 84 F.3d at 1417-18. Sandin holds 
that state-created liberty interests will be limited to "freedom from 
restraint which . . . nonetheless imposes atypical and significant 
hardship on the inmate in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison 
life." Sandin, 115 S.Ct. at 2300. While this is undoubtedly a departure 
from Greenholtz, Thompson, et al., it is unclear exactly how radical a 
shift the Court intended to spur. See Sandin, 115 S.Ct. at 2306 (Breyer, 
J., dissenting). And it is still uncertain how broadly this circuit and 
others will construe Sandin's reasoning. 
 
It seems apparent that Sandin was concerned quite specifically with 
the problem of prison administration and the interest of the states in the 
effective control of inmates. Those interests are not at issue here, and 
so 
it may be that Sandin's new approach will not apply. See Ellis, 84 F.3d 
at 1418. Indeed, even the Greenholtz-Thompson line of cases did not 
directly deal with the type of liberty interest alleged here, and it may 
be 
that both Sandin and Greenholtz will prove to be imperfect analogies. At 
all events, this close and difficult legal problem was not adequately 
briefed before us, and, since we will vacate Frey's sentence and permit 
Pennsylvania to conduct a new hearing, and potentially a new 
proportionality review, we need not reach this issue at this time. 
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